Some light, plenty of shadow in the “Europe” region thirty years after the World Conference on Women

Some light, plenty of shadow in the “Europe” region thirty years after the World Conference on Women

By Silke Steinhilber

The thirtieth anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women is an opportunity to take stock of gender equality policy at national, regional and global levels. The Commission on the Status of Women in March 2025 is the central global forum for reviewing the “successes and challenges”, as UN speech terms it; the corresponding Preparatory Regional Conferences have already taken place in all regions of the world (in the European region, the meeting happened in October 2024). Governmental reports have been drafted and a civil society consultation on the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (PfA) have been completed for the October meeting.[1]

The 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing was a milestone for women’s rights and gender equality policy. At this conference, 189 countries adopted the Beijing Platform for Action, which summarizes gender equality policy measures in 12 fields of action. The platform aims to “achieve gender equality” and to “(…) remove all obstacles to women’s active participation in all areas of public and private life by ensuring their full and equal participation in economic, social, cultural and political decision-making processes.” Since 1995, there have been regional and global review conferences every five years, at which signatory states prepare voluntary reports and for which civil society also critically comments on the implementation of the Platform for Action.

The UN’s “Europe” region is extremely diverse. It includes 56 member states, ranging from the EU members to the Balkans, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Central Asian countries.[2] The reports are correspondingly diverse, both in terms of the political and economic framework conditions in the different countries, and the thematic focus and factual density of the reports. While countries are invited to answer all questions for the review, they can of course set their own priorities. Also, while reading the reports, one has to be aware that in national reports to international organizations, governments are always inclined to want to appear in a good light – even if “successes” or “failures” have no direct consequences in the review process.

Reading across the national reports from the ECE region nevertheless can give a broad perspective on political priorities and national discourses in the field of women´s rights. Most countries in the ECE region report that they place particular emphasis in gender equality policy on measures in three areas of the Platform for Action: Gender-based violence; secondly, women’s economic rights or economic independence; and thirdly, political participation and representation. A closer look and interpretive reading reveal further regional similarities and trends, even if the conditions and framework conditions differ greatly within Europe.

Context: multiple crises and political backlash

All reports emphasize the impact of the multiple global crises of recent years on the implementation of the Platform for Action in the region, in particular the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation and the energy crisis. Some countries explicitly justify the restriction of investment in gender equality policy with the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine[3] , and a budgetary focus on military and security. However, even where this connection is described less clearly, a widespread anti-social policy and austerity discourse seeps through many country reports.

Many country reports expose a lack of political will on the part of authorities to pursue serious, effective or innovative gender equality policies or effectively implement laws and commitments. In the absence of comparable standards, it is difficult to assess the impact of policies, yet many of the reports consist of presentations of programs and measures. Conservative gender discourses permeate many of the reports: For example, measures in the field of family policy, particularly toward “traditional” families and women’s caring roles, are presented as gender equality policy. Along these lines, for example, the Hungarian report points out that “Within the framework of the Strengthening the role of women in the family and society (2021-2030) action plan, additional measures were formulated in order to promote access to affordable, sustainable and quality childcare (…).” (Hungary, p.34). Similarly, the Turkish report points out that “Strengthening the role of women within the family context is essential for the overall empowerment agenda” (Türkiye, Para. 659).

Conversely, measures that promote a transformation of gender roles in childcare and elsewhere in society by focusing on men and boys are less commonly presented. One of the positive examples is Denmark, which reports that, in May 2024, the Danish Government launched the first ever national action plan on men and boys’ gender equality with several initiatives on a range of areas, such as family life, physical and mental health, education and homelessness (Denmark Narrative Report, p. 10).

Demographic change, specifically the falling birth rates, is cause for concern for most European governments. As a result, incentives to increase in birth rates are frequently reported as measures toward the implementation of the PfA – typically without justification how an increase in birth rates enhances women’s rights and situation. Belarus, for example, reports that “… a family capital program has been implemented for the birth (adoption) of a third or subsequent child.” (Belarus, p.7). In Hungary, from 1 January, 2023, mothers who give birth to their child before their 30th birthday are be exempt from paying personal income tax until they turn 30 (Hungary, p. 15). Italy has also introduced a Universal Allowance to encourage childbearing (Italy, para. 145).

Intersectional discrimination versus binary oppositions

In recent decades, a growing number of countries have developed policies that reflect an understanding of the intersectional interweaving of different grounds of discrimination. Reference to intersectional discrimination and respective measures to counter discrimination can be found in several national reports (for example, the reports from Cyprus, Belgium, or Romania), yet the focus is mainly in relation to national and ethnic origin, (dis)ability and age (in relation to discrimination against girls as well as against older women).

To little surprise, there is no consensus as to the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity as components of gender equality in the region. Some country reports, especially from EU member states, link gender equality and gender diversity policy, some refer at least to the situation of lesbian and trans women. Other reports do not include the topic at all. Yet, numerous countries apply a rather essentialist or biologistic tone in their reports. Some emphasize the necessity of upholding a binary framework for gender and sex-related concepts, recognizing only “man” and “woman” as legally and socially valid categories. Along such lines, the preservation of “traditional family values” is highlighted and household responsibilities and childcare are firmly assigned to women. Most notably, the Russian Federation reports that “educational events, forums, and seminars for young people are held, the purpose of which is to instill in them traditional cultural and family expenses, a responsible approach to creating a family and having children…” (The Russian Federation, p.23).

The power of international standards and the weakness of implementation at national level

The potential influence of international norms on national decisions and discourses is particularly evident in the area of gender-based violence. Here, the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, known as the “Istanbul Convention” provides a clear framework for both understanding and combating gender-based violence.[4] The Convention has positively influenced political decisions in many countries, even (or perhaps especially) in the context of shrinking resources for gender equality policies. Also, the Convention’s benchmarks help to illustrate where the objective of eliminating gender-based violence is blatantly missed and services are inadequate. However, deficiencies in the full implementation of the Istanbul Convention tend to be glossed over in the Beijing reports. References to the country-monitoring of the Istanbul Convention through its monitoring body are frequently omitted, for example.[5]

Above all, however, the Istanbul Convention provides clear points of reference that also encourage discussion in countries that have not signed the Convention. No other international legal standard, neither the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) nor Conventions by the International Labour Organization (ILO), appears to have sparked such a transnational dynamic in the field of gender equality in recent decades. At the same time, maybe no other topics symbolizes so clearly the lack of political will to achieve real progress in the face of an ever-worsening situation: Improvements in data collection and availability clearly show how gender-based violence is a constitutive part of European societies and continues to rise, for example in new forms and spaces, such as digital violence.

Sometimes the impact of international norms is more hidden. Countries like to praise their progress which has been propelled by international regulations, for example due to EU law, but do not mention the international standard. Prominent examples of this are the quota of women on supervisory boards in EU countries, or the increase in childcare rates for toddlers and pre-school children in the EU. Particularly in countries that are in the process of joining the EU, discussions on gender equality policy gain momentum when progressive actors can refer to EU law and compare the local situation with the member states. The absence of international regulations, on the other hand, often makes progress more difficult.

Data availability and comparability is an area of important progress. Many national reports demonstrate that the years of internationally coordinated efforts to improve data on gender equality have actually brought results. There have been advances with respect to the comparability of data, particularly within the EU and accession countries. The collection and analysis of data for the calculation of the EU Equality Index is a good example how discussions can be enhanced by composite indexes. Similarly, the specifications of indicators within the framework of the SDGs have promoted evidence-based political discussions over the years. Still, important data gaps persist, thus slowing feminist policymaking.

Discussions about data limitations caused by a merely binary (male – female) data collection system and the need to further advance data on intersecting forms of discrimination are not reflected in the country level report. A few countries have made progress on data collection beyond the gender binary. Netherlands, for example, reports that “a priority for strengthening national gender statistics is the availability of more intersectional data. Various routine surveys already include intersections for some data, such as that between gender and level of education, age, or ethnicity (often defined as ‘migration background’). (…) Additionally, the major routine survey on LGBTIQ+ persons also provides data disaggregated by gender” (Netherlands, para 475).

Stagnation or regression?

Overall, reading the reports leaves a bland, or even bitter taste. In the Regional UN Report, the diplomatic phrase chosen to describe the general situation is that “progress on gender equality is uneven”. However, if we look at the most important priorities as listed by the countries themselves, it is questionable how much progress has actually been achieved in the decades since Beijing.

For example, the political participation and representation of women are highlighted as a key equality issue in the most countries. Yet, overall, progress in women’s political representation has been quite limited and even reversed in some countries. There seems to be an unspoken representation threshold in political bodies somewhere around 30%: Examples for progress beyond that threshold are rare. In the parliaments of the OSCE countries, women were on average of 31.6% of parliamentarians in 2024. The number of elected female heads of government in the OSCE area fell between 2023 and 2024. On average, no more than 15% of decision-making positions are held by women in the OSCE area.

There is also no ground-breaking progress to report in terms of women’s economic independence, the second shared priority by countries in the ECE region. All the countries continue to aim at increasing women’s participation in the labor market. Most countries implement numerous programs to support women’s entrepreneurship. Many reports present figures to illustrate advancements toward women’s economic status, yet too often evidence for structural changes in the labor markets is missing. Especially in the field of economic advancement of women, the country reports tend to present many individual, selective interventions, each with very limited numbers of participants.

Also, countries have long implemented the same type of measures in the area of labor market and economic policy, such as supporting women-owned businesses, or improving the childcare infrastructure. The country reports are full of statements on the creation of “economic opportunities” for women and improving access to economic leadership positions. Yet this contrasts with the widespread and well-documented feminization of poverty in many countries, as well as the special vulnerability to poverty of certain groups of women, such as single parents and older women. Gender-specific dimensions of economic violence, e.g. the connection between private and public debt, or the intertwining of violence in the social environment with structures of economic violence, are hardly discussed. Sweden is the only country to use the notion of “economic violence” (Sweden, p.19).

When it comes to the income and earnings gap, little appears to have changed for the better in recent years. Wage policies, in particular minimum wage regulations have benefitted women as they are overrepresented among low-income groups. Many countries describe interventions for pay equity or pay transparency (e.g. all EU members are required to transpose the respective EU Directive), yet progress is described as slow, and the advancements that are reported are hard to compare. Not a single “success story” is reported across the region against the deepening of societal income inequalities or against the disproportionately greater exposure of women to poverty or the dramatic gender gap in wages, income, wealth and inheritance. Where gaps have closed in recent years, for example in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, this was often due to a deterioration in the situation of men and not a result to targeted interventions in favor of gender equality.

Serious and worrying setbacks in gender equality and women’s rights are rarely mentioned in the official reports on Beijing + 30. Most reports avert discussing the threat posed to women’s rights by the prevailing political shift to the right throughout the region. The steady rise of authoritarian and anti-feminist discourses is scantly mentioned. While academic research and civil society organizations in recent years have highlighted the links between antifeminist discourses and the steadily growing threat to democracies, the Beijing reports do not discuss this trend.

Also, debates and policymaking on women’s sexual and reproductive rights (in the reports sometimes subsumed under the topic of “health”) and setbacks in access to contraception and abortion across the region are barely reflected in the reports. The Danish report is an exception, as it highlights that importance of “Strengthening the right to abortion and women’s rights to a free choice” and continues that “women’s rights to freely choose over their own bodies and lives have since then been cornerstones for gender equality in Denmark and have ensured women’s participation on the labour market and their economic independence” (Denmark, p.18). Also, the Dutch report includes mention that “access to abortion has been improved (… and…) the abortion pill will be made available at general practitioners from 2025 onwards, making it more accessible to those seeking an abortion.”

While a shrinking of spaces for political discussion, reflection, democratic participation and activism is reported by feminist organizations from different countries in the region, this is not reflected in the Beijing +30 reports. Along the same lines, the direct, including violent, repression against feminists and human rights activists that civil society reports expose, including criminal prosecution, intimidation and restrictions of an administrative and bureaucratic nature, are not addressed. Only a few countries mention the crumbling of a political consensus on the goal of gender equality. A number of reports establish a link between the experience of gender-based threats and violence and women’s and queer people’s political participation. Existing measures and plans to promote the political participation of women are thwarted by authoritarian, anti-feminist, anti-democratic actions, yet this is not acknowledged in most country reports.

What is missing?

The individual Beijing +30 reports and the entire review process of the Platform for Action illustrate that it would be necessary to adapt the Platform for Action as a framework for gender equality policy to today’s challenges and realities. Since the Beijing+5 Conference in 2000, there have been suggestions to this end from some progressive governments, but above all from feminist civil society. However, due to the increasing political backlash and the increasingly regressive discourse around the world, including in Europe, it seemed impossible to open up the “package” of the Platform for Action in order to respond to changing social, political and economic realities.

Because the reporting process is structured along the lines of the Platform for Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, cross-cutting issues and current topics in gender equality debates hardly receive the attention they deserve in the Beijing +30 reports. These include, for example, digitalization and the gender-specific effects of artificial intelligence. While digitalization is obviously considered important, the reports too often stop at describing gender gaps in access to and use of the digital infrastructure or describing the underrepresentation of girls and women in the relevant training courses, resulting in The widespread platitudes about the need for digital inclusion and increasing the education of girls in STEM fields. Yet, gender equality in the design of digital infrastructure and in AI systems are rarely taken into consideration. Overall, Beijing +30 reports appear to perpetuate a belief that technology advances freedom and equality. The deeper effects of digitalization and artificial intelligence on the shaping of society are not acknowledged in adequate depth. Often, not even data gaps or research desiderata are highlighted. On a positive note, however, the topic of digital violence or violence in digital forums is recognized by many country reports as a “new” form of gender-based violence. However, the available data on digital violence appears to be still inadequate.

Migration as a central, highly controversial, topic in European societies receives some attention in country reports. Yet the analysis and measures presented mostly stay on the surface. The reports illustrate, however, that perspectives on migration vary greatly between countries in the region: There are some countries where people emigrate or are displaced by war or dictatorship. Others have taken in migrants, even though the numbers differ significantly. Yet, the political framework provided by the Platform for Action on the topic of migration is too vague and the experiences with equality-oriented migration policy or migration-sensitive equality policy are too local and too few overall to be adequately addressed. The same applies to the topic of war, peace and conflict resolution, a topic that is mentioned in numerous country reports but not addressed fully. Numerous reports mention the UN “Women, Peace, Security” agenda, yet the reporting on Beijing +30 rarely delves into the topic in greater detail.

The developments and discussions surrounding the care economy and care policy, which have become one of the most important topics in the field of economic equality and gender justice in recent decades, are only partially addressed in most reports. Instead of taking into account the systemic role of paid and unpaid care work as value creation processes in the economic system, the country reports continue to focus on the “reconciliation of work and family” as a typical “women’s problem”. Although many reports reflect an awareness that care was a central issue during the COVID-19 pandemic, the dramatic nature of the care crisis that is emerging in most ECE countries and which is of course not only a gender equality policy issue, does not receive the attention that would be required in terms of social policy.

Another weakness of the Beijing +30 reports in the UNECE region is the lack of attention to the connection between the climate crisis and gender justice, and the urgency of gender mainstreaming in the necessary and ongoing socio-ecological transformation. The ECE regional overview report very clearly emphasizes that the challenges posed by the climate crisis for women and marginalized population groups in the region are not being adequately addressed. In addition to the weak political will, there is still insufficient gender disaggregated and intersectional data on the climate-gender nexus.

What next?

National reports that are presented in the context of international processes such as the Beijing +30 review, tend to give an overly optimistic portrayal of the situation. Still, the reports for the Beijing +30 review leave a bitter taste. On the one hand, the threats to democracies in general and gender equality policies in particular that are driven by authoritarian, anti-feminist forces are not adequately reflected in the reports. Numerous reports expose an anti-equality background tonality. Therefore, it seems totally inadequate when the UNECE Regional Conference in October 2024 calls in unison with the UN Secretary-General for a “faster” implementation of the platform. Who in the international community is still committed to fully implementing the Platform for Action?

A call for cooperation between different gender equality policy actors, including the private sector and civil society, has been formulated for years. It seems to miss the political reality in many countries in the region. In particular, the optimism that the UN continues to place in the private sector is hardly underpinned by evidence. The Beijing +30 reports show very few examples where companies have actively promoted gender equality without a strong regulatory framework, i.e. national or international regulations. And it is precisely this regulatory framework, for example anti-discrimination laws, that is currently being called into question in many countries as part of the political backlash.

What remains thus is the hope for the network of feminist civil society and its remaining allies at country and multilateral levels. It is important not to (further) tone down the analysis or political proposals: Every review process, every Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) Meeting, can open a space for feminist policy analysis and critical review, but is far from guaranteeing it. In the face of antifeminism at national, regional and multilateral levels, and confronted with austerity policies at all levels, feminist voices are more needed than ever.

[1] The available governmental reports for the region can be found at https://unece.org/gender/events/beijing30-regional-review-meeting. The civil society statements can be found at https://ngocsw-geneva.ch/beijing-30/

[2] Canada, the USA and Israel are also part of the ECE region, although of these three, this time only Canada has submitted a report.

[3] The wording with regard to the consequences of the Russian attack on Ukraine differ considerably depending on the position of individual countries in relation to the conflict and their relationship to Russia.

[4] See https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/home

[5] For the country-level monitoring of the Istanbul Convention by the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), see https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/country-monitoring-work

Subscribe to our feminist newsletter
We keep your data private and share your data only with third parties that make this service possible. Read our Privacy Policy.

Discover more from

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading